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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the
STATE OF UTAH
BYRON C. MUNSEE,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
Case No. 9351

vs.
EDNA MUNSEE,
Defend;ant and Res,pondent.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
INTRODUCTION
The Statement of the Case appearing in the
brief of Appellant, is not supported by the Record.
A part of the difficulty derives from the fact that
no apparent effort has been made to reference the
purportedly factual statements therein made to the
Transcript of Record. Some of the allegations, while
unsupported by the Record, are probably immaterial
to the determination of the issues in this case. In
order that this Court may consider only the evidence
as it was presented to the lower Court, Respondent
1
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makes the following statement of facts based on
the record in the case.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Respondent and the Appellant were married
in Phoenix, Arizona on the lOth day of March 1958.
(R. 1 & 5) Appellant and Respondent came to Salt
Lake City, Utah and resided with Appellant's mother
just prior to Appellant's entering the Armed Forces
of the United States. (R. Tr. No. 1 P. 5) Appellant
joined the Air Force in October of 1958. (R. 5)
Appellant has not resided in Utah since entry in the
armed services of the United States in October 1958.
(R. 5) Neither Appellant or Respondent has within
three months prior to the commencement of the action maintained a residence in Salt Lake County,
State of Utah, either rented, owned, or borrowed.
(R. Tr. No. 2, p. 2) Neither Appellant nor Respondent lrad a residence within Salt Lake County, State
of Utah to which they could return or to which they
expressed an intention of returning or· at which
their mail was accumulated. (R. Tr. No. 1, p.5)
The entire record is absolutely devoid of any indication that Utah was, three months prior to commencement of ~the action, actually the residence or legal
domicile of the parties. There is not ~any statement
in the record from which it might be argued that
either ·Of the parties after leaving Utah in October
1958 intended to return to Utah as a permanent
residence.
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POINT RELIED UPON
PLAINTIFF - APPELLANT HEREIN - TO VEST
THE UTAH COURT WITH JURISDICTION TO DECREE
DISSOLUTION OF HIS MARRIAGE TO RESPONDENT
IS REQUIRED TO ALLEGE AND PROVE TO THE
COURT THAT HE HAS BEEN AN ACTUAL AND BONA
FIDE RESIDENT OF THIS STATE AND OF THE
COUNTY WHERE THE ACTION IS BROUGHT FOR
THREE MONTHS NEXT PRIOR TO COMMENCEMENT
OF THE ACTION. SINCE APPELLANT FAILED TO
DO SO THE LOWER COURT WAS REQUIRED TO DISMISS THE ACTION FOR WANT OF JURISDICTION.

ARGUMENT
PLAINTIFF - APPELLANT HEREIN - TO VEST
THE UTAH COURT WITH JURISDICTION TO DECREE
DISSOLUTION OF HIS MARRIAGE TO RESPONDENT
IS REQUIRED TO ALLEGE AND PROVE TO THE
COURT THAT HE HAS BEEN AN ACTUAL AND BONA
FIDE RESIDENT OF THIS STATE AND OF THE
COUNTY WHERE THE ACTION IS BROUGHT FOR
THREE MONTHS NEXT PRIOR TO COMMENCEMENT
OF THE ACTION. SINCE APPELLANT FAILED TO
DO SO THE LOWER COURT WAS REQUIRED TO VISMISS THE ACTION FOR WANT OF JURISDICTION.

30-3-1 UCA 195'3 as amended provides:
"30-3-1. Procedure Residence Grounds. - Proceedings in divor'ce shall be
commenced and conducted in the manner provided by law for proceedings in civil causes,
except 1as hereinafter provided, and the court
may 'decree a dissolution of the marriage contract between the plaintiff and defendant in
all cases where the plaintiff shall have been
an actual and bona fide resident of thi's state
and of the county where the action is brought
3
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for three months next prior to the comme~ce
ment of the action, for any of the following
causes: * * *"
This section of the Utah Code has been previously interpreted by this Honorable Court. In the
case of Weiss v. Weiss, decided May ·2, 194 7, 111
U. 3'53, 179 P. 2d 1005, this court in reference to the
section quoted stated:
"This is a limitation on the power of the
court to 'act in respect to the marriage 'status
ensuing therefrom. If the court finds that
there was an actual and bona fide residence as
specified it has the power to dissolve or refuse to dissolve the contract depending on
what it concludes as to the merits of the case.
If it finds that there was not such residence
it has no power to further act as to the m~ar
ri'age contract and if it acts in such regard it
exceeds its authority. * * * The court after
the filing of the complaint had power and
authority, in fact the duty, to determine
whether or not it had jurisdiction of the status
of marri'age existing between the defendant
and plain tiff. * * * The court had power to
'determine that jurisdictional fact, but having
determined that the length and type of residence required for it to obtain jurisdiction
of the status of the marriage between the
plain tiff and defendant did not exist it should
have dismissed the 'action for lack of jurisdiction respecting the marriage contract and
the status of marriage ensuing therefrom.

* * *"
In the instant case appellant alleged in his com4
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plaint that he was an actual and borra fide resident
of Salt Lake County, State of Utah and had been
so for more than three months immediately prior to
the commencement of the a'ction. ( R. 1) This statement was denied by respondent in her 'answer (R. 5),
and was further traversed by her in her Motion for
Order Va'catirrg Order of Custody and To kbate
action and Suspend Proceedings. ( R. 7) Under this
state of the pleading the appellant had the burden
of proving residence to meet the statutory requirements.
17 Am. Jur. DIVORCE & SEPARATION -· P. 528, Sec. 390 - ''Residence or
Domicil. - Prior to the en try of the final
decree of divorce, the court is not to presume
or assume th'at the plaintiff has a domicil
within the state or that he has complied with
the statute prescribing a period of residence
before suing for a divorce. The plaintiff has
the burden of proving that he hais a domicil
within the state and that he ha:s complied with
the statute prescribing the preliminary period
of residence. * * *''
"When the defendant moves to dismiss
the suit on the groun'd that the plain tiff is not
a resident of 'the divorce state, the plaintiff
has the burden of proving that he is a resident. Aldrich v. Aldrich, 1'53 Fla. 8'56 1 16 So.
2d '47.
In the ca'Se of Gladney v. Gladney, 'a Texa:s case
24 SW '2d 9'6, the plain tiff claimed the residence of
his parents 'as his residence for the purpose of attempting to satisfy the statutory residential requirement. The Court held:
1

1

5
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"The Burden of proving residence . to
qualify is on plaintiff and m~rely to claim
his fathers residence a:s his Without further
proof is not sufficient to constitute compliance
with ~a statute requiring resi'dence for six
months next prior to the commencement of
the action."
That the Utah Supreme Court recognizes that
plaintiff h'as the burden of proving compliance with
the statutory residence requirements seem's to be
clearly shown by the language employed in the case
of Kidman v. Kidman, decided Dec. 11, 194'5, 109
U. 81, 164 P. 2d 201. At page 202 of the Pacific
Report of the opinion the court said:
"Respondent alleged that he was an actual bona fide resident of Sanpete County.
This allegation was expressly admitted by
answer. However, plaintiff's testimony as to
his bona fide residence was somewhat meager.
This sketchy testimony on the matter was apparently due to the fact th'at, in view of the
admission contained in the answer, counsel
assumed that there was no actual issue relative thereto. Had there been a controversy as
to residence, a serious question might arise
as to whether the allegations of bona fide residence in Sanpete County were sufficiently
proved. * * *"
There seems to be no question, therefore, that
the burden of proving the allegations of the complaint of Appellant of residence in Salt Lake County,
to give the court jurisdiction under the law fell
'
upon the plaintiff and appellant herein. This burden
6
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Appellant failed to carry. 'The Court below afforded
to Appellant's attorney ~and to appellant, who was
present in court, ample opportunity to give any facts
which would support the allegations. (R. Tr. No. 1,
p. 5) The record is totally devoi d of any proof of
residence meeting the statutory requirements.
Appellant in his brief has chosen to treat this
matter as one in which the requirement of actual
bona fide residence in the state and county for three
months next prior to the commencement of the action, would be in some manner waived or eliminated
because the appellant was in the United States Air
Force. Appellant has also dealt at length with the
definition of domicile. The previously rendered decisions of this Court have established that the requirements for dom'i!cile generally, and the statutory resi dence requirments of the divorce statute are
not the same.
In the ,case of Kidman v. Kidman, (supra) at
page 202 of the Pacific Report the court says :
1

1

1

"The first recited assignment is grounded upon the provisions of Sec. 40-3-1 DCA
1943 (note: this is the same section as 30-3-1
DCA 1953) as amended by Chap. 46, Laws of
1943, whereby jurisdiction is conferred upon
'a district court to decree dissolution of the
marriage contract ''where the plaintiff shall
have been an actual and bona fide resident
of this state and of the county where the a'ction is brought for three months next prior
to the commencement of the action." We as7
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sume that being an "'actual and bona f~de
resi'dent" of a county comprehends the maintenance therein of something more than a
mere legal residence."
In the case of Weiss v. Weiss (supra) the Court
was more specific:
at Page 1008 of the Pacific Report: - "In
this state, and in fact in many states the old
basis of matrimonial domicile as the condition for jurisdiction of the "matrimonial res"
or marital status has given way to "unitary
domicile" as the basis of jurisdiction. And
unitary domicile need be according to the interpretations of certain of the state courts
construing the term "residence" as used in
the statutes, little if any more than mere
presence in the state for the preS'cribed length
of time, and under the second Williams case,
supra, states other than that of the original forum are free to attack collateraiiy
the jurisdictional grounds of the de'Cree granted by the divorcing state. The confusion and
uncertainty of divorce de'crees in any other
than the state granting them by the present
state of the law is well pointed out in the dissenting opinions in the second Williams case,
supra. It should be pointed out that the matter
of legal confusion and uncertainty is not identical with the deeper underlying social problems that are involved in easy and strict divorce laws upon which the stability or deterioration of our social structure may depend
although they are connected problems. And
it is not here our provin'Ce to suggest social
remedies. * * *"
Speaking on this same subject and particularly
8
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as affected by military services the law is stated
by American Juris prudence to be:
17 Am. Jur. DIVORCE AND SE'PARAATI'ON P. 4'70, Sec. 297 "Generally. -'The
general rule that the domicil of a member of
the Armed Forces is not changed or lost ·by
his en try in to military servi~e or by his being sent to another jurisdiction under military orders is rapplied in divorce cases, so that
in determining the jurisdiction domicil of a
member of the Armed Forces, the fact that he
is transferred to a post outside the state does
not affect the domicil that he had prior to the
transfer. In many states, however, the jurisdictional requisite is "actual residence" as
distinguished from, and in addition to, legal
domicil, and where a member of the Armed
Forces had a legal domicil within the state
but had been absent from the state on military service for 'all, or nearly all, of the statutory waiting period and did not maintain a
residence within the state while he was absent,
it has been held that he did not have an actual residence within the state ras required
by the divorce statute."
In the case of Marshall v. Marshall, a Connecticut case, 36 A 2d 743 the Court was 'called upon
to interpret the Connecticut Statute which provides,
"If Plaintiff shall not have continuously resided in
this state three years next before the date of the
·complaint, it shall be dismissed." In the Marshall
case the facts were that Plain tiff was in the United
State Navy and assigned to New London, Connecticut. He expressed himself as having become very
9
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~ttached to New London and its people and intend-

ing to return there to live when he retired. Pr'ior to
his retirement he was transferred in 1938 to Boston,
M~assa:chussetts and he remained there for several
years prior to the commencement of the divorce action. The fa:cts reflected that he had not returned
to New London during his tour of duty in Boston.
The Court held that while plaintiff's intention to
return to New London might be sufficient to keep
his domicile in New London, it did not support a
finding of continuous residence as required by law.
The Court took cognizance of the admonition direct..
ed to it that under such a ruling very few service
men could meet the necessary residential requirements for a divorce in Connecticut, but the Court
said that if this was so it constituted a legislative,
not a judicial problem.
In the Idaho case of Hampshire v. Hampshire,
decided Nov. 10, 1'950, ;70 Idaho 52'2, 223 P. 2d 950
the court held that the Idaho statute requiring actual bona fide residence for six full weeks prior to
Commencement of the action, Section 32-701 Idaho
Code meant:
"To constitute a residence within the
meaning of the divorce statute, there must be
a habitation or abode in a particular place for
the required time and an intention to remain
there permaneJ?-tly or. indefinitely. An actual
residence as distinguished from a constructive one."
10
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Perhaps the landmark case in this field is the
case of Hiles v. Hiles, a Virginia case decided March
14, 1935, 178 SE 913. In this 'case the plaintiff was
a pay clerk in the United States Navy. In 1919 he
married the defendant a:t Dover, New Hampshire.
He was transferred thereafter to Hampton Roads
Virginia in 1'9'20. He established and m'aintained a
residence in Portsmouth, Virginia until Jan. 19'30
for himself and wife when he was ordered to China.
From December 1930 to March 1933 he was on active
duty in China and then in 'Hawaii en route from
China to H'aWaii and then en route from Hawaii
to Hampton Roads. His wire joined him in China
in February 1930 in Shanghai. The Complaint alleges that she deserted him in China in December
1930. His wife remained in China until February
1932 and then went to Hawaii where she remained
until June 1932 when she returned to Virginia.
Plaintiff returned to Virginia in March 1933 and
instituted suit two months after his return. Plaintiff testified that he considered Virginia his permanent residence, but admitted that he had not
lived in Virginia for the past three years. The Virginia Statute provides: - ''No suit for annulling a
marriage or divorce shall be maintainable unless one
of the parties is domiciled in, and is and has been
an 'actual and bona fide resident of this state for
at least one year preceeding commencement of the
11

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

suit. * * *". The Court in interpreting the law as
applied to the facts summarized above, sa'id:
"'To have been an actual bona fide resident of this state for one year preceeding the
institution of a suit for divorce, means to have
had in this state throughout that period an actual bona fide permanent abode as contradistinguished from a sojourn or transitory abode
in this state or elsewhere. The plaintiff need
not have been physically present in Virginia
every day during that period, but it is essential that during such part of that year as
he was absent from Virginia he was actually
maintaining in good faith at least a locality
somewhere in Virginia as his permanent
abode. * * * 'There must be some evidence of
concurring a~ts or forebearance to act which
tend to show the actual ·continued maintenance in good faith of some locality in Virginia
as and for his permanent abode. Neither the
unexpressed nor the mere expressed intention to so maintain a pla:ce or locality in Virginia as his permanent abode is alone suffi·cient to constitute the maintenance thereof
as such. Nor is such intention plus the bare
fact that he has retained his prior habitat in
Virginia after several years absence without having established more than a transitory residence elsewhere sufficient. There
must be actuality of residence.
"There are many facts which are of -evidentiary value as tending to show 'Continued
actual maintenance in good faith by a person
of a place or locality as his permanent abode
while he is absent therefrom. Among them
are the following: The fact that he leaves his
wife and dependent children there while con-,
12

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

tinuing to support them; the fact that he
keeps a house or a room there ready for his
occupancy or has rented it out for a comparatively short time because of his intention to
return and occupy it; the fact that he preserves his identiy as an inmate of a parents
or other relatives home there; or the fact that
he maintains the place or locality as a permanent address for his mail while absent,
* * * but each case must stand upon its own
peculiar facts and circumstances. * * *
The evidence is sufficient to establish a
continuance by them of domicile in Virginia
but it is not sufficient to establish that either
of them 'continued to 'be an actual and bona
fide resident of this state after he or she left
to go to China in 1930. It is true that plaintiff was in the service of the United States
Navy and went to China and remained there
and elsewhere under orders until he returned
under orders to Virginia in March 1H33. But
these facts did not operate to preserve his
status as an actual bona fide resident of this
state without his having done anything indicative of the continued maintenance of some
place or locality in Virginia as his permanent
place of abode. * * *"
The lengthy analysis in Appellant's brief of the
cases bearing on the loss of domicile for voting or
other purposes by a serviceman departing his domicile under military orders, has, in so far as the respondent can determine, absolutely nothing to do with
this case. The most that can possibly be said for
the :fa;cts as shown by the Record in the instant case
is that appellant and respondent were married in
13
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the state of Arizona. A few months after marriage
they came to Utah and resided with the appellant's
mother while appellant found work. (R. Tr. No. 1.
P. 5) They were only here at the most three months,
(date of arrival and departure are not given,) and
then appellant enlisted in the Air Force and went
to Travis Air Force Base at Fairfield, California
and has remained there since with his family, until
the respondent left appellant and returned to Arizona. (R. Tr. No. 1. P. 5 and Tr. No.2. P. 1) From
October 1958 until the commencement of the ~action
there is no showing that appellant ever returned to
the state of Utah or that he at any time even expressed the intention of doing so. It is expressly
stated that appellant never at any time maintained
a residence, either rented, owned or borrowed in
Salt Dake County, State of Utah. (R. Tr. 2, P.2)
;The record is completely devoid of any expressed
intention on the part of appellant or respondent
that Utah was ever their residence or permanent
place of abode. Under this state of the facts we do
not think it pertinent to examine the myriad of
court decisions relating to the effect upon established domicile of an ~absence brought about by entering military service. Suffice it to say that a review of these cases clearly discloses that the facts
as reflected by the Record in this case would not
establish the Statutory requirement for jurisdic14
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tion for a divorce under the doctrine of any of the
cases cited by the Appellant or the addition'al cases
examined by respondent.
CONCL'USION
The appellant having the burden of showing
compliance with the statutory residence requirements upon which the jurisdiction of the Court is
based, and having failed to show that the necessary
requirements were met, the lower court correctly
dismissed the action. The a'Ction of the lower court
in so doing should be sustained.
Respectfully submitted,
JOHN S. BOYDEN
ALLEN H. TIBBALS
Attorneys for Defendant
and Respondent
By Allen H. Tibbals
351 So. State St., Suite #2
Salt Lake City 11, Utah
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